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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to decide the issues on appeal in the instant 
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1996). Because the matter comes before the 
Court as an appeal of a summary judgment in a civil case not involving domestic relations, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-2a-3(2) (1996), it is not within the original jurisdiction of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, and was, therefore, appropriately transferred to the Utah Supreme 
Court. {See R. at 200 for the Court's Order.) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE NO. 1: Whether Craig Curtis Smith ("Smith") is precluded on 
appeal from challenging the trial court's factual findings given that he did 
not marshal the evidence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: As has been correctly argued by Four Corners in its 
appellate brief, an appellant who attacks the sufficiency of a court's factual findings must first 
marshal all of the evidence that supports the court's judgment, and then show that the 
evidence cannot support the judgment. Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 769 (Utah 
1985). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN 
THE TRIAL COURT: The requirement of marshaling the evidence arises on appeal. 
ISSUE NO. 2: Whether summary judgment in favor of Larry and 
Carolyn Randall should be affirmed on the grounds that the Randalls 
were clothed with the same governmental immunity from suit as the 
Division of Child and Family Services has. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary judgment is proper only when no genuine 
issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
1 
R. Civ. P. 56(c). Whether the trial court's granting of a motion for summary judgment on 
grounds of governmental immunity was appropriate is a question of law; the appellate court 
accords no deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Hall v. Utah State Dept. of 
Corrections, 24 P.2d 958, 962 (Utah 2001); Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 
417-18 (Utah 1998). The appellate court resolves only legal issues on an appeal from a 
summary judgment; it reviews the trial court's ruling to determine whether the trial court 
correctly held that no disputed issues of material fact existed. Taylor v. Ogden School Dist, 
927 P.2d 159, 162 (Utah 1996). The granting of a summary judgment can be affirmed "on 
any ground available to the trial court, even if not relied on below." Wilson at 418. 
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN 
THE TRIAL COURT: The Randalls' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 102-103); Oral Arguments dated March 20,2001, (R. 
205, p. 29); and Oral Arguments dated June 19, 2001 (R. at 206, p. 17-21 and 23-25). 
ISSUE NO. 3: Whether summary judgment in favor of Larry and 
Carolyn Randall was proper on the grounds that Smith did not timely 
comply with notice and prelitigation procedures of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act, U.C. A. § 78-14-1, etseq. (hereinafter "UHCMA"). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Whether the Randalls, like Four Comer's Mental Health, 
were health care providers entitled to the protections of UHCMA is a question of law 
reviewed for correctness. Platts v. Helping, 897 P.2d 1228,1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). See 
the additional standards set forth under Issue No. 2, above. 
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN 
THE TRIAL COURT: The Randalls did not argue to the court below that they should be 
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protected by the provisions of the UHCMA. The Court, sua sponte, ruled that the Randalls 
were entitled to the same statute of limitations protection as were Four Corners. 
ISSUE NO. 4: Whether, as foster parents appointed by the court, the 
Randalls are immune from claims of simple negligence. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: As was previously noted, the granting of a summary 
judgment can be affirmed "on any ground available to the trial court, even if not relied on 
below." Wilson at 418. See also, Straub v. Fisher and Paykel Health Care, 990 P.2d 384, 
386 (Utah 1999). Though raised by the Randalls in their Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the trial court did not rule on this issue. The Randalls are asking the 
court to create a new legal standard in this case that pertains to court-appointed foster 
parents, such as the Randalls. Whether this Court should hold that the Randalls are immune 
from claims of liability for simple negligence is a mixed question of fact and law. Factual 
findings are reviewed for clear error and the legal conclusions for correctness. Nunley v. 
Weststates Casing Servs., 989 P.2d 1077,1083 (Utah 1999). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN 
THE TRIAL COURT: The Randalls' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 102-103) and Oral Arguments dated June 19,2001 (R. 
at 206, p. 30). 
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ISSUE NO. 5: Whether, as foster parents appointed by the court, the 
Randalls had a legal duty to protect Smith from assault by a third 
person. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Again, the granting of a summary judgment can be 
affirmed "on any ground available to the trial court, even if not relied on below." Wilson at 
418. See also, Straub at 386. Though this issue was raised by the Randalls in their 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment below, the trial court denied 
summary judgment on the ground that disputed issues of material fact existed (R. at 188). 
The Randalls are asking this Court to create a new legal standard in this case that pertains to 
court-appointed foster parents such as the Randalls. Whether this Appellate Court should 
hold that the Randalls had a duty to protect to protect Smith from assault by a third person is 
a mixed question of fact and law. Factual findings are reviewed for clear error and the legal 
conclusions for correctness. Nunley at 1083. 
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED 
IN THE TRIAL COURT: The Randalls' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 99-101). 
ISSUE NO. 6: Whether the trial court committed plain error in granting 
summary judgment when discovery requests from Smith to Four 
Corner's remained unanswered. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Trial Courts are given broad discretion over matters 
involving discovery, and a court's determination on discovery matters is reviewed for abuse 
of discretion. Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1244 (Utah 1980). A review of a grant or 
denial of a Rule 56(f) motion is likewise reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard; a 
4 
failure to review missing evidence is not reversible error unless, but for the error, the 
outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande 
W.R.. 830 P.2d 291, 293 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN 
THE TRIAL COURT: Smith raised this issue in his brief. It is the Randalls' and Four 
Comer's position that the matter was not properly preserved in the trial court and should not 
be considered on appeal. 
ISSUE N O . 7 : T he A ffidavit o f T racy M orris c ontains h earsay and 
unfounded opinion testimony, and Smith should not be allowed to add 
evidence to the record on appeal. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(h), 
the Randalls hereby adopt by reference the arguments of Four Comers as set forth under 
point 6 on pages 20 through 21 of its brief. This issue should be reviewed for clear error. 
State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51, f 13, 4 P.3d 778, 781 (Utah 2000). 
CITATION TO THE RECORD SHOWING THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED IN 
THE TRIAL COURT: Defendant Randall's Motion to Strike portions of Tracy Morris 
Affidavit and supporting Memorandum (R. at 160-164); Objection to Want Ads, Oral 
Argument (R. at 206, pp. 21-22). 
KEY STATUTES 
The meanings and applications of the following statutes are key in this case: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4, subsections (3)(b) and (4), in their pertinent parts: 
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(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or proceeding based 
upon the same subject matter against the employee or the estate of the 
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless: 
(i)the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice; 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity in a 
representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for which 
the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held personally 
liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the employee's 
duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority, unless it is 
established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(2)(a): 
"Employee" includes a governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, 
trustees, commissioners, members of a governing body, members of a board, 
members of a commission, or members of an advisory body, officers and 
employees in accordance with Section 67-5b-104, student teachers certificated 
in accordance with Section 53 A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in 
providing services to members of the public in the course of an approved 
medical, nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, 
volunteers, and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor." 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The following statement of the case includes several issues not included in Smith's 
brief and also includes references to the record as required in the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
During all relevant times in this case, Larry and Carolyn Randall (hereinafter 
"Randalls") were court-appointed foster care providers who were licensed, approved and 
controlled by the State of Utah, Division of Human Services (also referred to in this matter as 
the Division of Child and Family Services (hereinafter collectively referred to as "DHS") (R. 
at 002, Yl 7-8). In addition, the Randalls were supervised by Four Corners Mental Health 
(hereinafter "Four Corners") (R. at 002, H 9). 
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Appellant Craig Smith claimed that during June 1993, while he was in the Randalls' 
care, he was sexually assaulted by another male foster child assigned to the Randalls (R. at 
002 ffi[ 13-14). Smith's Complaint alleged that the "Randalls were negligent and left [Smith] 
and the other foster placement unattended and without supervision thus allowing the attack 
on [Smith] to take place" (R. at 003, ^  17). Related claims were made against Four Corners 
and DHS (R. at 003-004). 
DHS filed a motion to dismiss on or about January 7,1999, asserting governmental 
immunity (R. at 014-15). Said motion was granted (R. at 026-27). While DHS's dismissal is 
not directly challenged in this appeal, it is highly significant because the trial judge 
incorporated DHS's arguments and its dispositive ruling on the Motion to Dismiss in 
granting the Randall's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. at 188-89). 
During October of 2000, the Randalls and Four Corners filed separate Motions for 
Summary Judgment and supporting memoranda (R. at 047-82 and 093-104). In general, the 
Randalls asserted that the undisputed facts proved they were not negligent, and the Randalls 
claimed that they were protected by the shield of governmental immunity to the same extent 
as DHS. Four Corners claimed, among other things, that Smith's claim was time barred 
under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (hereinafter UHCMA"). Following oral 
argument the court granted summary judgment for both parties (R. at 191). With respect to 
the Randalls, the trial court concluded that because of their relationship to DHS and Four 
Corners, the Randalls were "clothed with the same immunities and statute of limitation 
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protection as the Division of Child and Family Services [DHS] and Four Comers Mental 
Health" (R. at 189). Smith appeals the summary judgment ruling. 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Smith has not marshaled the evidence. C onsequently, the Randalls necessarily 
supplement the Smith's statement of facts. See Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage, 872 
P.2d 1051,1053-54 (UT Ct. App. 1994) (supplemental facts needed when appellant fails to 
marshal evidence). 
1. Smith erroneously claims in Paragraph 1 of his Brief that the Randalls admitted 
during oral arguments that they are not a governmental entity immune from suit under the 
Utah Governmental Immunity act. The record does not support that claim. Four Comers 
alone admitted that it was not a governmental entity immune from suit. The Randalls, on the 
other hand, re-asserted their immunity claim. (Oral Arguments dated June 19, 2001, R. at 
206, p. 17-21 and 23-25.) 
2. The following statement is contained in the trial court's Memorandum Decision: 
"[B]ecause of the relationship of the Randalls with Division of Child and Family Services as 
the contractee (foster parents), and also because of the relationship which the Randalls have 
with Four Comers Mental Health, that is as foster parents or individuals supervised by/and 
for whom services were rendered by Four Comers Mental Health, the arguments which Four 
Comers Mental Health makes, which are beneficial to the Randalls as agents of Four Comers 
Mental Health as well as the arguments which Division of Child and Family Services 
previously made this Court believes controlling." (R. at 188-89.) 
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3. The Randall's Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 
095-098) sets forth the following undisputed facts supported in the record as indicated: 
1. Onoraboutthe 14th day of January, 1992, Craig Smith ("Smith") was 
placed in DHS custody by order of the Seventh Judicial District court. 
(Complaint at ^  7.) 
2. During March, 1992, DHS placed Smith in the home of the Randalls, 
persons who were licensed, approved and controlled by DHS as foster parents. 
(Larry and Carolyn Randall Affidavit, at ^ 2, hereinafter referred to as the 
"Randall Aff.") 
3. During February, 1992, DHS and/or Four Corners placed James Bybee 
("Bybee") in the Randall's home. Thus, Bybee was already in the Randall 
home at the time Smith was placed in the home. (Randall Aff. at f^ 3.) 
4. At the time Bybee was placed in the Randall's home, the Randalls were 
not made aware of or informed in any way that Bybee possessed a violent 
character or demonstrated homosexual tendencies. They were not instructed 
that he presented a risk of any kind to Smith or anyone else and they were not 
told to provide special and/or intensive supervision of Bybee or Smith. In fact, 
Bybee was working toward independent living and was under the least 
restrictive supervision available in the agency program. (Randall Aff. at ^  4.) 
5. With full knowledge of the placing agency, Bybee and Smith shared the 
same bedroom for almost a year before Bybee left the Randall home in about 
February 1993. They did so without incident (other than the normal type of 
disputes typically exhibited between brothers who might share a bedroom). 
On at least three occasions, the boys were even authorized by the agency to 
sleep together outside unsupervised. (Randall Aff. at [^ 5.) 
6. The Randalls, on their own, did not know and had no reason to know of 
Bybee's alleged homosexual and violent tendencies, and at no time had any 
reason to suspect that he posed any kind of risk to others, especially boys. 
While he was with the Randalls, and even before the incident in question, 
Bybee's supervisors allowed him to date females, without supervision. Bybee 
dated on various occasions without incident. (Randall Aff. ^ 6.) 
7. Smith claims that during June 1993, Bybee bound Smith with ropes and 
also gagged him so he couldn't speak or yell. He then allegedly assaulted 
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Smith, touching his penis and anus, and raped him. (See Complaint at ^  14 & 15.) 
8. At the time of the alleged commission of crimes by Bybee against 
Smith, the Randalls had no knowledge of any wrong doing and had no reason 
to anticipate or foresee any such problem. To this day, the Randalls are not 
sure exactly which night the alleged incidents took place. If they occurred 
during sleep outs, there is nothing the Randalls could have done to foresee or 
control the situation. The boys had been authorized to sleep out and had been 
sleeping unsupervised in the same room for almost three months by that time. 
The Randalls reported any allegations they received immediately. (See 
Randall Aff. |^ 7). Smith never told the Randalls about the ratpe. The boys 
continued living together for up to eight additional months after the alleged 
rape and never said anything and did not act as though anything was wrong. 
(See Randall Aff. at If 7.) 
9. Smith remained in the Randall home after Bybee left. The Randalls had 
a great relationship with Smith. Smith fit in perfectly with their family. The 
Randalls loved Smith and would have gladly adopted Smith had they been 
given the opportunity (Smith would have been returned to the Randall home a 
short time after first leaving but sadly they were not allowed to take him 
because they had two other boys in their home at that time). The Randalls 
frequently engaged in open dialogue with Smith and never detected any 
problem. (See Randall Aff. at ^ 8.) 
10. The Randalls were shocked about the accusations when they learned of 
them. In part, they were surprised because they felt that Smith was stronger 
and tougher than Bybee and would have never allowed such an incident to 
occur. (See Randall Aff. at U 9.) 
11. At all times in question, the Randalls provided proper care and 
supervision over Smith and Bybee. (See Randall Aff. at ^ 10.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court correctly concluded that because of the relationship between DHS and 
the Randalls, who at all times relevant herein were serving as court-appointed foster parents, 
the Randalls were cloaked with governmental immunity to the same extent as DHS. Smith 
cannot challenge the factual findings pertaining to the relationship between the Randalls and 
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DHS, or any other factual matters, because he failed to marshal the evidence supporting the 
Court's findings. The appellate court should accept the trial court's factual findings as valid. 
Based on the doctrine of "law of the case," it is incontrovertible that DHS was 
immune from suit under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10, 
as a governmental entity that was engaged in a governmental function when the alleged 
assault took place. Because of and their relationship to DHS as court-appointed foster 
parents, the Randalls' were "employees" under the Act and are likewise immune from suit 
pursuant to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
Furthermore, the Randalls were protected by the provisions of the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act ("UHCMA") found at Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-14-1 to 78-14-16. The trial 
court, sua sponte, ruled that the Randalls were entitled to the same UHCMA statute of 
limitation protection as Four Corners. At the time of the incident in question, Four Corners 
was a "health care provider" under the UHCMA. Because of the special relationship 
between the Randalls and Four Corners, the Randalls were agents of Four Comers and, thus, 
protected under the UHCMA. Smith failed to timely file the required notice of intent to 
commence action, failed to seek prelitigation panel review as required under the UHCMA, 
and is thus barred by the statute of limitations from pursuing a UHCMA claim against the 
Randalls. 
The Randalls also assert that foster parents cannot be held liable for acts or omissions 
involving simple negligence. They request that the court adopt the common law principle 
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that parents, or those standing in loco parentis (such as foster parents), can only be held 
liable for willful or wanton misconduct toward children in their care. 
As another alternative argument, the Randalls argue that no special relationship 
existed between them and the foster placements, including Smith. Since there was no special 
relationship, the Randalls did not owe a duty of care to Smith and, therefore, cannot be held 
liable for damages sustained by Smith on the theory of simple negligence. 
Additionally, the Randalls argue that the court should reject Smith's complaints 
regarding Four Corner's failure to fully respond to interrogatories. Smith did not properly 
preserve the matter in the court below. He failed to file a motion under URCP 56(f) and did 
not file a motion to compel. 
Finally, as to the last two arguments, the Randalls adopted the arguments of Four 
Comers. The court should disregard the inadmissible hearsay and opinion statements 
contained in the affidavit of Tracy Morris and should disregard the want ad that was 
improperly offered into evidence by Smith during oral arguments. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. Smith Failed to Properly Marshall the Evidence and Is Precluded 
from Challenging the Trial Courts Factual Findings. 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(h), the Randalls hereby adopt by 
reference the arguments of Four Comers as set forth under point 4 on pages 19 through 20 of 
its Brief. Because Smith has made no attempt to marshal the evidence, he should not be 
allowed to challenge on appeal the court's factual findings regarding the relationship between 
the Randalls and DHS and the Randalls and Four Comers. 
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II. The Randalls Were Clothed with the Same Governmental 
Immunity as the Division of Child and Family Services. 
The trial court's legal conclusion that the Randalls were clothed with governmental 
immunity to the same extent as the Division of Child and Family Services, referred to herein 
as "DHS," can best be understood by simultaneously keeping in mind two key rulings in the 
court below. First, the trial court ruled on a Motion to Dismiss filed by DHS that DHS was 
immune from suit in this case (R. at 026-27). Smith has not appealed that ruling. Second, in 
granting summary judgment in favor of the Randalls, the trial court explicitly incorporated 
and relied upon the arguments raised by DHS in its Motion to Dismiss; the trial court 
concluded that the Randalls were immune from suit to the same extent as DHS (R. at 188-
89). The import of each of these issues is explained below. 
In its Motion to Dismiss, DHS successfully argued that it was immune from suit 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10, which provides, in relevant part: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of, in connection 
with, or results from: . . . . (2) assault, battery, false imprisonment. . . . 
The trial court specifically adopted DHS's factual and legal arguments and concluded 
that DHS was immune from suit for the alleged assault pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(2) (R. at 027). As supporting legal precedent, the trial court relied upon the legal 
doctrines set forth in Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 849 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993) 
(school district immunized from suit arising out of battery of student by two fellow students; 
court to focus on the conduct out of which the injury arose, not the legal theory crafted by 
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plaintiff) and Sheffield v. Turner, 445 P.2d 367 (Utah 1968) (warden and prison officials 
immune from suit where one inmate has injured another). 
Smith did not appeal or in any way challenge the trial court's ruling that DHS was 
immune from suit in this case. Thus, the court's factual and legal conclusions on that issue 
are conclusive in this appeal, i.e., DHS was a governmental entity performing a governmental 
function and the alleged harm against Smith constituted an assault and/or battery; therefore, 
DHS was immune from suit by Smith against it. See e.g., Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 
P.2d 1034,1037 (Utah 1995) ("law of the case" doctrine provides that decision made on an 
issue during one stage of case is binding in successive stages of same litigation). 
Given the law of this case, the sole question now before this Court on the issue of 
immunity is whether the Randalls, who were acting as court-appointed, foster parents at the 
time of the alleged assault and battery, are cloaked with the same immunity as DHS. The 
trial court correctly concluded that they were. 
It is an undisputed fact in this case that "Smith was placed in DHS custody by order 
of the Seventh Judicial District Juvenile Court" and that "DHS placed Smith in the home of 
the Randalls, persons who were licensed, approved and controlled by DHS as foster parents" 
(R. at 002, ffl[ 7 &8). Based on such facts,1 the trial court logically concluded that the 
Randalls had a relationship with DHS as "contractee[s] (foster parents)" and that based on 
that legal relationship the Randalls were "clothed with the same immunities" as DHS (R. at 
188-89). In reaching that conclusion, the trial court explicitly incorporated the arguments 
lThe trial court does not detail the factual basis for its conclusion. 
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made by DHS in its successful Motion to Dismiss (R. at 189). The trial court correctly and 
necessarily concluded that the Randalls were employees of a governmental entity and, 
therefore, were immune from suit for the injuries arising out of the alleged assault and 
battery. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4, subsections (3)(b) and (4), in their pertinent parts, provide: 
(b) A plaintiff may not bring or pursue any other civil action or proceeding 
based upon the same subject matter against the employee or the estate of the 
employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless: 
(i) the employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice; 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity 
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for 
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee maybe held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of 
the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of 
authority, unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act 
due to fraud or malice. 
(Emphasis added). 
An "employee" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-2(2)(a) as follows: 
[A] governmental entity's officers, employees, servants, trustees, 
commissioners, members of a governing body, members of aboard, members 
of a commission, or members of an advisory body, officers and employees in 
accordance with Section 67-5b-104, student teachers certificated in accordance 
with Section 53A-6-101, educational aides, students engaged in providing 
services to members of the public in the course of an approved medical, 
nursing, or other professional health care clinical training program, volunteers, 
and tutors, but does not include an independent contractor." 
The Randalls were employees or servants of DHS and, therefore, "employees" under 
the Governmental Immunity Act. As court-appointed foster parents, they were "licensed, 
controlled and supervised" by DHS (R at 002, ^ 8). As employees of DHS, they are entitled 
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to the same immunity as their governmental employer. That conclusion is consistent with 
the language and intent of the Governmental Immunity Act. In articulating its reasoning as to 
why a prison warden is immune from suit for negligent acts under the Governmental 
Immunity Act, the Utah Supreme Court in Sheffield, supra at 369, spoke of "the imperative 
need for those in a supervisory capacity to have reasonable freedom to discharge the 
burdensome responsibilities of keeping in confinement and maintaining discipline of a large 
number of men who have been convicted of serious crime." The Court further stated: 
If such officials are too vulnerable to lawsuits for anything untoward which 
may happen to inmates a number of evils follow, including a breakdown of 
discipline and the fact that capable persons would be discouraged from taking 
such public positions. 
Foster parents too have an imperative need for reasonable freedom to discharge the equally 
burdensome, yet incomparably sacred, responsibilities of child-rearing, and all that it entails. 
Like other public servants whose duties immerse them in dealing with people of varying 
background and behavior, foster parents deserve protection from tort liability for simple 
instances of negligence. 
But unlike a prison warden, foster parents often have an even greater responsibility to 
shelter, feed, clothe, discipline, and provide loving care for troubled, >>e/ dependent, youths, 
without the benefit of on-site security staff, 'round the clock surveillance capabilities, and 
detention facilities. Therefore, foster parents should be shown greater protection from tort 
liability in relation to the children in their care. 
Parenthood, like childhood, is an inherently risky undertaking. As the events of just 
the past few months have so starkly shown, even the most loving and responsible parents, 
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despite their best efforts, cannot protect their child from the vicissitudes of life or from the 
depraved who prey upon the innocent and the vulnerable. The foster parent program provides 
needy children and the State with an overwhelmingly superior (and considerably less costly) 
alternative to the fate such children and society would otherwise confront. Adopting a simple 
negligence standard for such a program would not only chill the willingness of potential 
foster parents, but among existing foster parents would dictate "defensive parenting" 
concerned more with risk avoidance and self-preservation than the self-sacrifice that decent 
parenting demands. 
Accordingly, state-appointed foster parents in general (and the Randalls specifically 
under the facts of this case) should be deemed governmental employees under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act who are immune from suit under the provisions of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. In this case, the trial court properly concluded that the 
Randalls, as court-appointed and DHS supervised foster parents, were clothed with the same 
governmental immunity as DHS.2 
2See, e.g., Pickett v. Washington Ctv, 572 P.2d 1070, 1073-74 (Oregon Ct. App. 
1977)(foster parents generally immune from liability for acts and omissions relating to provision, 
care, and custody of a ward). 
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III. Smith failed to timely comply with notice and prelitigation 
procedures of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act ("UHCMA"). 
As has been previously noted, the Randalls did not argue in the court below that they 
should be protected by the provisions of the UHCMA. The Court, sua sponte, ruled that the 
Randalls were entitled to the same statute of limitations protection as Four Comers. Pursuant 
to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(h), the Randalls hereby generally adopt by reference 
the arguments of Four Comers as set forth under point two on pages 14 through 16 of its 
brief. What follows is an explanation of why or how the legal principles discussed by Four 
Comers are applicable to the Randalls, as well. 
The Randalls are protected by the provisions of the UHCMA under the narrow and 
specific facts of this case. The trial court made a factual finding that due to the relationship 
between the Randalls and Four Comers, the Randalls were "agents" of Four Comers and 
"individuals supervised by/and for whom services were rendered by Four Comers Mental 
Health" (R. at 188-89). As agents of Four Comers, they are entitled to the same notice as 
Four Comers. The definition of "Health Care Provider" under Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-
3(11), includes "agents" of the defined "health care providers. 
The trial court's factual conclusion regarding the Randalls' relationship to Four 
Comers cannot be challenged in this appeal because of Smith's failure to marshal the 
evidence. The Randalls, as agents of Four Comers, were properly granted summary 
judgment because Smith failed to timely and properly file suit under the UHCMA. 
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IV. As F oster P arents A ppointed b y t he C ourt, t he R andalls Are 
Immune from the Claims of Simple Negligence Alleged by Smith. 
In his Complaint Smith alleges that the "Randalls were negligent and left Craig and 
the other foster placements unattended and without sufficient supervision, thus allowing the 
attack on [the victim] to take place." (R. at 17.) If, for the sake of argument, such an 
allegation were deemed an instance of negligence on the part of the Randalls, the Randalls 
nevertheless contend that as a matter of law, Utah foster parents in general (and the Randalls 
specifically under the facts of this case) should be shielded from liability for merely negligent 
acts or omissions when one of their foster placements harms another foster placement. 
Inasmuch as there appears to be no controlling case or statutory law on this issue in this 
jurisdiction, it appears to be an issue of first review. 
Under the common law, parents are generally immune from suit by their children in 
cases involving simple negligence. Elkington v. Faust, 618 P.2d 37,40 (Utah 1980). See 
e.g. Brown v. Phillips, 362 S.E.2d 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) and Horton v. Reaves, 526 P.2d 
304 (Colo. 1974) (discussing and adopting common law doctrine of parental immunity for 
negligent acts or omissions). The Randalls urge that the common law principle of parental 
immunity for the negligent acts of parents be acknowledged and/or extended to the Randalls 
and other foster parents. "When one stands in loco parentis to another, the rights and 
3Elkington involved intentional sexual assault and abuse. The Utah Supreme Court 
acknowledged the common law concept of parental immunity but noted (in dicta) that the trend is 
away from immunity. Without ruling on the issue of parental immunity for negligent actions, the 
Court found that given the facts of the case the abuser clearly did not have a claim for immunity. 
Elkington v. Faust, 618 P.2d 37, 40 (Utah 1980). 
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liabilities arising out of that relation are, as the words imply, exactly the same as between 
parent and child." Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64, 66 (Utah 1978) (quoting Sparks v. 
Hinkley, 78 Utah 502, 5 P.2d 570 (1931). Given that parental immunity is the law of this 
jurisdiction, as well as the other arguments against a simple negligence standard provided 
supra, Foster parents, who stand in loco parentis to the foster placements, should be 
accorded the common law shield against claims by their foster children for simple 
negligence/ 
V. As foster parents appointed by the court, the Randalls had no legal 
duty to protect Smith from or warn him of the risk of assault by a 
third person. 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(h), the Randalls hereby generally 
adopt by reference the arguments of Four Corners as set forth under point three on pages 16 
through 19 of its brief. What follows is an explanation of why or how the legal principles 
discussed by Four Corners are applicable to the Randalls, as well. 
In general, there is no duty to control the conduct of others, except in certain 
situations such as when a special relationship exists. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
231, 235 (Utah 1993). Utah courts have taken a "policy-based approach" in ascertaining 
whether a special relationship exists. Id. Such determination "requires careful consideration 
of the consequences of imposing that duty for the parties and for society." Id. (citations 
4The Georgia Court of Appeals specifically concluded that foster parents, in their standing in 
loco parentis, were in every way entitled to immunity from suit by children in their care, just as 
regular parents, absent findings of willful and malicious conduct. Brown v. Phillips, 342 S.E.2d 
786, 788 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986). 
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omitted). Appellate courts have been "loath to recognize a duty that is realistically 
incapable of performance or fundamentally at odds with the nature of the parties' 
relationship." Id. (citations omitted). The Court should examine the following factors in 
determining whether a special relationship exists: the identity and character of the parties 
involved, the relationship of the parties to each other and the "practical impact" that finding a 
special relationship would have. Id, (citations omitted). 
The Higgins court set forth the following guiding principles in cases like this one: 
In the context of a claim that an actor having custody or control of another 
owed a duty to prevent harm to or by that other, our overriding practical 
concern is whether the one causing the harm has shown him- or herself to be 
uniquely dangerous so that the actor upon whom the alleged duty would fall 
can be reasonably expected, consistent with the practical realities of that 
actor's relationship to the one in custody or under control, to distinguish that 
person from others similarly situated, to appreciate the unique threat this 
person presents, and to act to minimize or protect against that threat. When 
such circumstances are present, a special relationship can be said to exist and a 
duty sensibly may be imposed. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Applying the forgoing legal principles to the facts in question in this case, the Randalls did 
not have a special relationship with Smith. In their role as foster parents over the two 
placements, the Randalls were subject to the orders of a court, the directions of DHS, and the 
supervision of Four Corners. They had no control over the details of their supervision and 
merely followed directions from those above them. Smith and the alleged perpetrator shared 
the same bedroom for almost a year without incident. The Randalls had no indication 
whatsoever that the alleged perpetrator had the inclination to rape, might attempt to rape, or 
could succeed in his attempt to rape, his male roommate. 
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As foster parents in this case the Randalls simply did not know or have reason to 
suspect that Bybee was a threat to Smith. They had no practical means of appreciating or 
recognizing the risk, and thus, no way to protect against it. On the night that Smith was 
allegedly attacked, the Randalls were following guidance from their supervisors who said the 
boys could sleep out unsupervised. 
If the Randalls are held liable on the theory of simple negligence for the actions of a 
foster child 1) who over the course of almost a year gave no indications of being a threat to 
Smith in any way, 2) of whom Smith did not complain to the Randalls, after for months after 
the alleged assault occurred; and 3) over whom they had limited or no practical control, a 
pervasive chilling effect on state foster care programs is to be expected. It is the very nature 
of the foster care programs that parents receive at-risk children who are typically troubled in 
one way or another. If foster parents are to be held liable for negligent supervision of such 
children, then it is probable that many couples will choose to not take in and care for such 
children. The Randalls, therefore, as foster parents, did not have a special relationship with 
either foster child. As a consequence, they owed no duty to prevent Smith's alleged harm 
and cannot be held liable for its occurrence. 
VI. Smith did not properly preserve his claim that the trial c ourt 
committed plain error in granting summary judgment when 
discovery requests from Smith to Four Corner's remained 
unanswered. 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(h), the Randalls hereby adopt by 
reference the arguments of Four Corners as set forth under point 5 on page 20 of its brief. In 
addition, the Utah Supreme Court has emphasized that Rule 56(f) is intended to ensure that 
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diligent parties are given an adequate opportunity for discovery. Brown v. Glover, 16 P.3d 
540,547 (Utah 2000). The court added: "An attorney has a professional responsibility to 'act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.' Therefore, an attorney 
has a responsibility to use the available discovery procedures to diligently represent her 
client. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide the means to do this." Id (Citations 
omitted). Smith did not even file a motion under Rule 56(f). He cannot now benefit from his 
own lack of diligence. Smith's complaints about discovery are ill-timed and unfounded. 
VII. The Affidavit of Tracy Morris contains hearsay and unfounded 
opinion testimony and Smith should not be allowed to added 
evidence to the record on appeal. 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(h), the Randalls hereby adopt by 
reference the arguments of Four Corners as set forth under point 6 on pages 20 through 21 of 
its brief. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based on the forgoing, the summary judgment in the Randalls favor should be 
affirmed and the Randalls should be awarded their costs under Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 34(a). 
An Addendum is not necessary. 
Dated this 29th day of July 2002. 
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